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COOPTING THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE: OF
SOURCES AND SPRAY PAINT
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Public sympathy may well be on the side of the police. The U.S.
Constitution may not be,"' the radio talk show host opened his show.
He then told of how an Albuquerque police officer's impersonation 2 of
a television news reporter resulted in the arrest of a graffiti vandal. It
was a story with which the listeners were familiar-a hot item in the
New Mexico print and broadcast media.' The listeners filled the next
hour with on-air telephone
calls, discussing the matter with the show's
4
guest, a media lawyer.
Undercover work has become an indispensable technique for modern
law enforcement investigative agencies.' Still, certain undercover practices
raise important issues: the First Amendment6 right to a free press; the
safety of journalists who report on crime; and ethical questions concerning
the role of the journalist in society. This article examines the controversy
surrounding, and the ramifications of, the Albuquerque graffiti incident.
II.

THE CONTROVERSY

A.

The Albuquerque Incident
While covering news for KGGM-TV (now KRQE), Reporter Dave
Brown developed a relationship with members of the Albuquerque Police
Department's gang unit. 7 Knowing that, APD Officer Leonard Garcia
called KRQE on August 7, 1992.8 Garcia said he was going to try to
arrest the vandal who spray-painted the mark "Dumbo" on many locations in Albuquerque. 9 Garcia planned to pose as a reporter and asked
Brown to take part in the operation.' 0 Brown responded, "We really
have reservations about you posing as a journalist, for one thing, and
we don't want to be part of an operation where you're using us to pose
'
... as [a] journalist[ l.""
Nonetheless, Brown and Videographer Paul
Burt went with Garcia. 12 "We didn't want to be part of the operation

1. Terry Leedom Show (KKOB-AM radio broadcast, Sept. 10, 1992).
2. Id.
3. See Mike Gallagher, Media See Dangers in Police Posing as Reporters, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Aug. 30, 1992, at Al.
4. Terry Leedom Show, supra note 1.
5. 75 AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 37 (1991).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. Gallagher, supra note 3, at A4.
8. Telephone Interview with Dave Brown, Reporter, KRQE-TV (Nov. 6, 1992).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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but we wanted to observe the situation happening,' '1 3 said Brown. "[Garcia] still wanted us to be part of the operation and we declined."' 4
Garcia assumed his cover as a reporter, then went to interview sixteenyear-old Jose Lopez at a park." Without Lopez knowing, Burt shot video
of the meeting.' 6 Burt and Brown then followed Garcia and Lopez to
a graffiti-defaced highway bridge. 7 Concluding that Lopez was not
"Dumbo", Garcia instead went to Lopez's home on August 27 to arrest
him for painting the graffiti mark "Shade."'" Burt and Brown were at
the police station to shoot video when Garcia brought in Lopez.19
Brown's News Director, Jim Loy, joined in Brown's denial of any
participation in the operation: "I don't believe the teenager could see
our camera until after the arrest. We were not part of the officer's
disguise ....
We didn't have access to the telephone conversations [between Garcia and Lopez] and [Garcia] was not wearing a microphone
during the arrest." ' 20 KRQE's report
of the incident included the issue
2
of the journalist impersonation. '
B.

Other Incidents
The Albuquerque incident is not isolated. A survey volume on police
surveillance contains the following:
During the protests of the 1960's, the tactic of police posing as
members of the media was often used, and it still occasionally is. A
1984 article reports 13 cases of police pretending to be members of
the media in the preceding eight years. This is probably only a small
fraction of the total number of cases, most of which are not discovered. 22
Furthermore, incidents of police posing as television reporters at a
marijuana-law protest and impersonating a newspaper reporter investi23
gating narcotics are documented.
Other reports include:
* 1979: "The arrest plan ...
involved posing as news reporters
....
[The officer] called [the defendant]
on the telephone and
24
identified himself as a freelance writer."

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.; Gallagher, supra note 3, at A4.
Brown, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gallagher, supra note 3, at A4.
Id.

22.

GARY

T.

MARX,

UNDERCOVER:

POLICE SURVEILLANCE

IN AMERICA

23. Id.
24. Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 188, 220 (D. Utah 1982).

151 (1988).
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* 1988: "While posing as reporters, several [Columbus, Ohio] undercover officers have worn bright yellow jackets emblazoned on
the back with 'WOCB News."' 25
* 1988: "[The plaintiff] yelled . . . 'Death to Sid Kramer!' That
day Montgomery County police officers went undercover to monitor the rally. Posing as a photographer and reporter, [defendants]
26
approached [plaintiff] to question him about his statements."

* 1991: "[Tiwo undercover detectives posed as reporters at a news
conference called by [a peace activist] ....

The two Kansas City

police officers carried fake press credentials, a camera and a note
pad .... 2

Indeed, it may have been hard to separate fact from fiction in the
newspaper "TV Highlights" for February 26, 1988. The listing for Miami
Vice described Detective "Tubbs go[ing] undercover as a reporter to
infiltrate the tribe . .

.,.

Policies of Law Enforcement Agencies
Albuquerque Police Department policy permits officers to pose as
journalists. 29 "The media has to do what it's going to do and I have
to do what I have to do to arrest the crooks," 3 0 explained Albuquerque
Police Chief Bob Stover. "The use of a disguise or a character," added
Albuquerque City Attorney David Campbell, "for purposes of legitimate
law enforcement activities is not a prohibited kind of activity. ' '31
Seventy-one days after the arrest of Lopez, Stover narrowed his department's policy somewhat.3 2 Now, either Stover or a deputy chief must
Furthermore, the
give prior approval for an officer to use the practice."
34
practice is now reserved for "'serious situations."
The New Mexico State Police Department appears to have a policy
similar to that of the Albuquerque Police Department. 35 Under some
John Denko may even
circumstances, New Mexico State Police Chief
36
issue news credentials to undercover officers.
Not all police departments, though, employ such practices. Mike Letz,
Commander of the St. Louis Police Department's intelligence unit deC.

25. Robert Ruth & Michael J. Berens, Police Spied on Boyland Campaign, Ex-Aide Says,
Nov. 6, 1988, at 01A.
26. Spratlin v. Montgomery County, Md., No. 90-2465, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19111, at *2
(4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1991).
27. Bill Bryan & Kim Bell, Not Interested in Protesters, Authorities in Area Say, ST. Louis
POST DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 1991, at IC.
28. Chris Rauser, TV Highlights, CHICAoo TRIBUNE, Feb. 26, 1988, at Tempo 4.
29. Gallagher, supra note 3, at Al.
30. Id. at A4.
31. Interview with David Campbell, Albuquerque City Attorney, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Oct.
26, 1992).
32. See Robert Rodriguez, Officers Must Get OK from Brass to Pose as Reporters, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Nov. 7, 1992, at Dl.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Gallagher, supra note 3, at A4.
36. Id.
COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
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clared, "I've never asked [an officer] to impersonate a newsman." 3 7 Even
the Kansas City police officers, who posed as reporters at the aforementioned 1991 news conference, were ordered to stop the practice the
day after the Kansas City Star reported the incident.3 8
Federal law enforcement agencies also appear to disfavor the practice.3 9
Drug Enforcement Administration rules prohibit agents from posing as
reporters. 40 Albuquerque DEA Office Director Tom Smith said, "The
guidelines are pretty clear .... We can't do it and we don't do it."'' 4
Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Albuquerque office, Matt Perez,
42
said his agency also prohibits the practice, except for emergencies.
Still, reporter Don Devereux found that the FBI does allow agents to
pose as reporters if approved by headquarters. 43 While working as a freelance reporter for the Scottsdale Progress, Devereux began a campaign
to oppose the practice when he learned that a prisoner had requested to
talk with him." The FBI sent an agent posing as Devereux's attorney,
however, after another prisoner tipped off the bureau. 45 The practice of
government agencies impersonating reporters worried Devereux: "If we
'
don't jump up and down vigorously now, this practice will just expand."
D. The Arguments
The primary argument for allowing police to pose as reporters is simple:
the police department's purpose is to catch criminals. If the practice aids
that purpose and is not entrapment, 47 it is not prohibited.4 The argument
against the practice is more complex: police posing as reporters cause a
chilling effect on the relationship49 between reporters and their sources,
dampening freedom of the press.

37. Bryan & Bell, supra note 27, at IC.
38. Cops Impersonate Journalists at Peace Rally, NEws

MEDIA

& THE

LAW,

Spring 1991, at

39.
39. Mike Gallagher, Federal Rules Usually Forbid Agents to Pose as Reporters, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Aug. 30, 1992, at Al.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Marcia Gelbart, False Pretenses, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 19.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Entrapment is:
[t]he act of officers or agents of the government in inducing a person to commit
a crime not contemplated by him, for the purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution
against him. According to the generally accepted view, a law enforcement official,
or an undercover agent acting in cooperation with such an official, perpetrates an
entrapment when, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime, he originates
the idea of the crime and then induces another person to engage in conduct
constituting such a crime when the other person is not otherwise disposed to do
SO.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed. 1990).
48. Campbell, supra note 31.
49. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at Al, A4; Terry Leedom Show, supra note 1.
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Even so, some who generally oppose the practice believe it may be
warranted in an emergency.50 An example of such an emergency occurred
on April 11, 1992, at the United Nations headquarters in New York
City." l A woman drove onto United Nations grounds and threatened to
blow up the van she drove and set herself on fire to protest paying taxes
for the Persian Gulf war.5 2 A standoff resulted and two police, carrying
a camera and posing as television reporters, approached the van." Still,
the practice did not end the standoff. 54 A petty misdemeanor such as
graffiti painting55 would not be considered an emergency.
III.

THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE

American journalists believe they have a privilege to refuse to reveal
information gathered on the job.5 6 Journalists argue that their privilege7
comes from three sources: common law, statutes, and the Constitution.1
The common law journalist's privilege is based on an expansion of
the recognized common law privileges such as attorney-client and doctorpatient." Society's benefit from the journalist's privilege is a freer flow
of information.5 9
Strong opposition to the privilege, though, is embodied in the public's
"right to every man's evidence.'"'6 The fewer the recognized evidentiary
privileges, the more evidence is available to policy makers and courtroom
factfinders .61
A.

History
Commentators note that as an alternative to the common law argument,
journalists
began persuading legislatures that they needed statutory pro62
tection:
The first so-called newspersons' shield law was enacted in Maryland
in 1898 to protect the confidentiality of news sources. It remained
unique for more than three decades before New Jersey adopted a
similar statute. Thereafter, lobbying campaigns by the newspaper industry have resulted in the enactment of shield
statutes of one type
or another in approximately half the states. 6

50. See Terry Leedom Show, supra note 1.
51. Dennis Hevesi, Standoff At U.N. With a Protester, N.Y. Tndas, Apr. 12, 1992, at sec. 1,
pt. 1, 44.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-15-1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
56. Sharon K. Malheiro, Note, The Journalist'sReportorialPrivilege- What Does it Protect and
What Are its Limits?, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 79 (1989).
57. Id.
58. HARVEY L. ZUCKMA ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 293 (1988).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ZUCKMAN ET AL, supra note 58, at 294.
63. Id.
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New Mexico's legislature enacted a shield law in 1973, providing for
a journalist's privilege. 6" The statute's effect was short-lived, though, as
the New Mexico Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1976 in
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.65 Chief Justice Oman's Ammerman opinion stated that the shield law was a rule of evidence created
by the legislature. 66 The court ruled that the legislature constitutionally
67
lacks the power to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure.
The New Mexico Supreme Court filled the gap in 1982 with a new
shield law through what commentators called "a novel method-court
rule." 6 The supreme court created a rule of evidence that embodies the
journalist's privilege. 69 The legislature then reasserted 70its original shield
law to apply to nonjudicial governmental proceedings.

64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1978). New Mexico's shield statute states:
A. Unless disclosure be essential to prevent injustice, no journalist or newscaster,
or working associates of a journalist or newscaster, shall be required to disclose
before any proceeding or authority, either:
(1) the source of any published or unpublished information obtained in the
gathering, receiving or processing of information for any medium of communication
to the public; or
(2) any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or
processing of information for any medium of communication to the public.
B. For the purpose of this act:
(1) "proceeding or authority" includes any proceeding or investigation before,
or by, any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative body or person;
C. If the proceeding in which disclosure is sought is in the district court, that court
will determine whether disclosure is essential to prevent injustice. In all other
proceedings, application shall be made to the district court of the county in which
the proceeding is being held for an order of disclosure. Disclosure shall, in no
event, be ordered except upon written order of the district court stating reasons
why disclosure is essential to prevent injustice. Such an order is appealable to the
Supreme Court if the appeal is docketed in that court within ten [101 days after
its entry. The matter shall be considered as an extraordinary proceeding and shall
be heard de novo and within twenty 120] days from date of docketing. The taking
of an appeal shall operate to stay proceedings as to the prevention of injustice
issue only in the district court.
Id.
65. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
66. Id. at 309, 551 P.2d at 1356.
67. Id. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358.
68. James C. Goodale et al., Reporter's Privilege Cases, in CommuNICATIoNs LAW 1991, at 559,
610 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No.
323, 1991).
69. N.M. R. EVID. 11-514(B)-(C) provides that:
[a] person engaged or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering,
procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating news for the general
public or on whose behalf news is so gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled,
edited or disseminated has a privilege to refuse to disclose:
(1) the confidential source from or through whom any information was procured,
obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated,
or delivered in the course of pursuing his professional activities; and
(2) any confidential information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional
activities.
There is no privilege under this rule in any action in which the party seeking the
evidence shows by a preponderance of evidence, including all reasonable inferences,
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The Federal Rules of Evidence do not specifically provide for any
privileges, leaving that function to legislation, common law, and conlaws have been proposed since
stitutional interpretation. 7 Federal 7shield
2
1929 but have never been enacted.
The first constitutional argument for a journalist's privilege was made
in 1958 . 73 Garland v. Torre74 was a libel action by singer Judy Garland
against New York radio-television columnist Marie Torre. 75 Torre refused76
to reveal the names of CBS executives whose statements she quoted.
Torre claimed the First Amendment 77 granted her a privilege of confidentiality.7 8 The Second Circuit embraced Torre's argument, holding
"compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an abridgement of press freedom by imposing some
limitation upon the availability of news." ' 79 The court stopped short of
recognizing an absolute privilege for journalists, requiring a balancing
80
of the public's "interest in the fair administration of justice.
The journalist's privilege provides reporters with an invaluable tool;
however, journalists should be aware of the responsibility that it demands. 8 1 In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the plaintiff provided politically82
sensitive information to the defendant's two Minnesota newspapers.
Reporters from the papers promised Cohen anonymity, but the newspapers
named Cohen as the source.8 3 Cohen lost his job after the publication
of his name, then sued for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of
contract.8 4 On appeal, Cohen lost the fraud claim.8 The Supreme Court
could successfully argue promissory estoppel
held, however, that Cohen
86
on the contract claim.

that:
(1) a reasonable probability exists that a news media person has confidential information or sources that are material and relevant to the action;
(2) the party seeking disclosure has reasonably exhausted alternative means of
discovering the confidential information or sources sought to be disclosed;
(3) the confidential information or source is crucial to the case of the party seeking
disclosure; and
(4) the need of the party seeking the confidential source or information is of such
importance that it clearly outweighs the public interest in protecting the news media's
confidential information and sources.
Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Goodale et al., supra note 68, at 978.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 294.
Id. at 295.
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
Id. at 547.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Garland, 259 F.2d at 547.
Id.at 548.
Id.
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., II1 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
Cohen, III S. Ct. at 2516.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 2520.
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B.

State Shield Laws and Journalist's Privileges
By 1991, twenty-eight states had shield laws. 87 These statutes fall into
three main groups: (1) unqualified protection against having to reveal
sources but no express protection against having to reveal work product
or unpublished information; (2) unqualified protection against having to
reveal sources of information actually published or broadcast but no
express protection against having to reveal information; and (3) narrow,
conditional grants of privilege or bases for the waiver of the privilege. 8
New Mexico's shield law falls within the first group.8 9
According to the renowned evidence treatise McCormick on Evidence,
the rationale asserted for the shield laws "is analogous to that underlying
the long-standing governmental informers privilege and is exclusively
utilitarian in character. Thus, it is contended that the news sources essential
to supply the public's need for information will be 'dried up' if their
identities are subject to compelled disclosure." 9
Sociologist Gary T. Marx added:
IT]he relationship between reporters and their sources has clear implications for a free society. When the confidentiality of that relationship can be breached at will, whether by holding reporters in
contempt of court if they refuse to reveal sources or documents or
by police pretending to be reporters, the quality and independence
of mass communication must suffer. 9'
Media lawyer and First Amendment authority William S. Dixon 92 finds
merit in the utilitarian argument, relating it to the constitutional argument. 93 Referring to the Washington Post's role in President Richard
Nixon's demise, Professor Dixon commented:
The press and the government are, and always should be, antagonists.
The government is trying to withhold information, the press is trying
to relate that information to the public ....
If there isn't that
antagonism and that conflict, the press isn't doing [its] job. I think
that we can see, over the past twenty years . . . the oversight that
the press has performed in its role as a surrogate for the public in
reporting on information that the public wouldn't otherwise have
access to. We've had some rather radical changes in personages who
run our government and in the kinds of government we have. 94
James Madison put it this way: "A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to

87. See Goodale et al., supra note 68, at 935-1003.
88. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 312 (citing Freedom of Information Center of the
University of Missouri School of Journalism).
89. See id.; Goodale et al., supra note 68, at 978.
90. i JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (4th ed. 1992).
91. MARX, supra note 22, at 151.
92. Professor Dixon is a Visiting Professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law.
He is also a Senior Partner in the Albuquerque law firm of Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A., where his clients include the Albuquerque Journal.
93. See Terry Leedom Show, supra note 1.
94. Id.
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a Farce or Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." 95
The Framers of the Constitution felt it unnecessary to enact an express
provision for freedom of speech.96 A government limited to enumerated97
powers, they thought, could not enact a law opposed to free speech.
Popular pressure demanded guaranteed individual rights, 9 though, and
it is no coincidence that the Bill of Rights lists the freedoms of speech
and press among the first to be protected.9
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ."10 The Supreme Court
interprets the First Amendment as requiring it to treat the freedoms of
speech and the press identically.' 0 '
Without a shield statute, journalists cannot always rely on a privilege. 10 2
In the 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes,03 reporters were subpoenaed
to testify in criminal investigations.'1 4 The Supreme Court refused to
interpret the First Amendment as implying a journalist's privilege. 05 Yet
the Court acknowledged that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections." 1 0 6 Noting that Branzburg was a five-to-four
decision," 7 at least nine federal circuits, including the tenth circuit, recognize a journalist's privilege. 08 A communications law handbook summarizes the relationship between the press and the judiciary, illustrated
by Branzburg, as an "abrasive confrontation . . . prompt[ing] renewed
interest in legislative approaches to the problem of the newspersons'
privilege. "09
IV.

CONSEQUENCES

The Los Angeles Police Department's manual states:
The use of a news media cover by an officer to obtain intelligence
information is not an acceptable form of undercover activity. Once
a police officer is discovered in such a role, particularly in a crowdcontrol situation, legitimate members of the media become suspect

95. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), quoted in Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 110-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.5 (4th ed. 1991).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Leslye DeRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for a FederalJournalist'sTestimonial
Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779, 783 (1991).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
101. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 96, § 16.19.
102. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 668-69.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 707.
107. See id. at 709-11; MCCORMICK, supra note 90, § 76.2.
108. See Goodale et al., supra note 68, at 919-20.
109. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 310.
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and could possibly be exposed to danger. In addition, such undercover
activity does damage to the trust which should exist between members
of a free society and the news media which serves them." °
Concerns over damage to the news media's ability to do its job prompted
Radio-TV News Directors Association President David Bartlett to protest
the Albuquerque incident to Albuquerque Mayor Louis Saavedra.",
Bartlett's letter urged the city "to make sure that no Albuquerque police
officer is ever again tempted to hide behind a phony press card .... "I
Also, Robert Richardson, news director of Albuquerque's KOB-TV, prom3
ised to seek legislation banning police officers posing as reporters."
The strained relationship between the Albuquerque news media and
police poses a possible threat to freedom. 1 4 "The media needs the police
as a source of news, but the police need the support of the media to
reach the public. This [incident] is the sort of thing that threatens that
balance,"" ' 5 surmised Hal Simmons, attorney for the New Mexico Press6
Association. "Do we retaliate and say we don't run Crime Stoppers?""1
wondered KRQE's Jim Loy. "I don't think so. We run Crime Stoppers
have to realize we represent the
as a community service, but the police
17
community, the people they serve.""1
A.

Danger to Journalists

Police officers impersonating reporters may pose other dangers. "I'm
sure it never occurred to anyone at [the Albuquerque Police Department]
that posing as a news reporter has much wider implications,"" ' 8 observed
Bernalillo County District Attorney, Bob Schwartz. "Have [the police]
put someone at risk? I don't know.""I 9
Contemplating the attacks on reporters during the 1992 Los Angeles
riots, Jane Kirtley of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
expressed concern that police activities, such as posing as reporters, subject
reporters to physical danger.' 20 Presumably, a criminal source may want
to hurt a reporter who the source believes to be a police officer.
To protect reporters from danger, Kootenai County, Idaho Sheriff,
Pierce Clegg, adopted a policy in 1989 against his undercover officers
posing as reporters.' 12 The action came after a Kootenai County captain

110. Los Angeles Police Department Manual, reprinted in MARX, supra note 22, at 151.
111. COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Sept. 2, 1992, at 5.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at Al.
115. Id.
116. Id.at A4. "Crime Stoppers" reports are public service television spots designed to solicit
evidence from the public on certain crimes that have been recently committed.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Idaho Lawmen Posed As Reporter, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 5, 1989, at B8.
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used a journalist cover at a Seattle anti-racism rally. 22 "We do understand
the situation it puts [reporters] into,"'' 21 Clegg said.
In Israel, journalists maintained their lives were endangered when police
24
and soldiers impersonated reporters to apprehend Palestinian protesters.
Despite Israel's lack of constitutional guarantees of the freedoms found
25
in our First Amendment, Israeli police promised to stop using the tactic.
The promise came after a telecast showed two plainclothes police officers
arresting Palestinian teenagers in East Jerusalem. 26 The Jerusalem Journalists Association threatened to stick "Police on Duty"127 signs in reporters'
car windows unless the police abandoned the tactic.
Bob Stover, too, recognized the danger to reporters. "I never really
thought about the possibility of putting a reporter's life in danger ....
I don't want to take the chance of getting someone hurt," said Stover
when he narrowed his department's policy.2 8
B.

The Journalist-SourceRelationship
Professor Dixon has stated that "[tihe function of the press under the
Constitution is to not only print information that is handed out by the
government ... but to go out and to acquire information ....
129
According to him, performance of that function requires the media to
persuade sources to talk. 3 0 "One of the most important functions of the
press is the investigation of criminal activity ....
Some [sources] would
not talk to the press under any circumstances
without
a belief in the
' 3
confidentiality of what they're saying.'

'

One commentator summed it up by stating that "[cilearly anonymity
has become a commodity in which both journalists and their sources
traffic.'

' 32

The importance of anonymity is illustrated by instances of

non-privileged reporters going to jail to protect their sources.'3 3 Trust is
vital to the relationship between a reporter and his source, especially if
the source requires anonymity. Police posing as reporters can diminish
that trust.
C. Comparison to Other Privileges
34
New Mexico's Rules of Evidence include these privileges: lawyer-client;
3
5
3
6
physician-patient;
husband-wife;
communications to clergymen;",
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Israeli Police Pledge to Stop Posing
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Rodriguez, supra note 32, at Dl.
129. Terry Leedom Show, supra note 1.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Kathryn M. Kase, When a Promise Is
Who Break Promises of Confidentiality to
(1990).
133. See Monica Langley & Lee Levine,
Aug. 1988, at 21.
134. N.M. R. EVID. 11-503.
135. N.M. R. EVID.

11-504.

as Journalists, REUTERS, Mar. 29, 1989, at 4.

Not a Promise: The Legal Consequencesfor Journalists
Sources, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 565, 571
Broken Promises,
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identity of informer; 38 and the journalist's privilege.3 9 Recognizing this,
radio host Terry Leedom told his talk show listeners: "Totally facetiously,
last week I mentioned that perhaps a lot of people in Albuquerque didn't
go to church over the weekend because they feared that the priest that
was hearing confession might well be a police officer."' 4 Leedom's guest,
Professor Dixon, responded: "This would directly interfere with the First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion and nobody would tolerate
it . . . It's exactly the same principle as the newsperson who has a
constitutional right to receive information from the public.' 4'
Many believe the journalist's privilege is most analogous to the privilege
protecting the identity of informers. 142 Those who believe the reporter's
role includes exposing corruption are likely to believe such a purpose is
valuable enough to warrant the privilege. 43 Professor Blasi epitomized
the analogy: "[T]he [journalist's] privilege . . . would most closely resemble that possessed by police informers. The privilege is justified only
when it helps a governmental institution-in the one case the prosecutor,
in the other the electorate-obtain the information it needs if it is to
fulfill its responsibilities."' 44 Further, this link between the journalist's
privilege and the informer's privilege took an interesting turn in a Detroit
incident. 45 There, an undercover officer went to prison for refusing to
reveal to a federal grand jury the names of informers whom he cultivated
with as much as $300,000 of police funds.'4
The analogy to the informer's privilege is not apparent, however, to
City Attorney Campbell. 47 He does not believe the lack of such a privilege
would cause police sources to dry up. 4 1 Campbell tried to explain his
position by citing another clause in the First Amendment. 49 "[Rjights
of association are also important in the Constitution,"' 5 0 argued Campbell.
"The graffiti .. .vandal wanting to associate with a news reporter, and
not with a police officer, that's his right."' 51 Campbell's argument is

136. N.M. R. EVID. 11-505.
137. N.M. R. EVID. 11-506.
138. N.M. R. EVID. 11-510.
139. N.M. R. EVID. 11-514.

140. Terry Leedom Show, supra note I.
141. Id.
142. MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS 68 (1979).

143. Id.
144. Hearings on Newsman's Privilege Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 745 (1973) (statement of Vince Blasi, professor
at Columbia University School of Law), reprinted in VAN GERPEN, supra note 142, at 69.
145. See Jim Finkelstein, Officer Won't Talk, Is Jailed, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 12, 1991, at
3A.
146. Id.
147. See Campbell, supra note 31.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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unpersuasive, but it is clear he does not believe police posing as reporters
iswrong.152
D. Due Process Concerns
The practice of police posing as reporters raises several due process
concerns, including whether evidence gathered through the practice should
be admissible at trial.'53 "The philosophy of each Amendment and of
each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that
of the other in its sphere of influence-the very least that together they
assure in either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional
evidence," stated the Supreme Court in the 1961 obscenity case of Mapp
v. Ohio. 5 4 In Mapp, evidence gathered in an unconstitutional search and
seizure was deemed inadmissible in a state court.'" The reasoning was
that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures6 links with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process require5

ment.1

A due process/fair trial issue was at the heart of United States v.
Outler. 1 In Outler, the defendant was a physician under investigation
for unlawfully dispensing and possessing controlled drugs. 58 Investigating
agents used hidden microphones to record their conversations with Dr.
Outler. 5 9 Oddly, one agent was a reporter for an Atlanta television
station, temporarily working with law enforcement officials. 6° Products
later appeared in a two-part television report on
of the investigation
6
unethical doctors.1 '

"The deliberate use of a news-reporter as an undercover agent in an
investigation by federal law enforcement officials, coupled with resulting
adverse publicity prior to an arrest and trial, is inconsistent with our
notions of due process and unnecessarily endangers a defendant's right
to a fair trial,"'162 warned Fifth Circuit Judge Morgan. The warning was
as far as Morgan went, though.' 63 Satisfied with the jury's impartiality,
64
the Fifth Circuit refused to reverse Dr. Outler's conviction.

152. Id.
153. The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be held to
U.S.
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime ... without due process of law .
CONST. amend. V.
154. 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
155. Id. at 656-57. The exclusion of evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment
was required of federal courts even before Mapp. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943).
156. Id. at 657. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
157. 659 F.2d 1306 (Former 5th Cir. 1981).
158. Id. at 1308.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1311.
162. Id. at 1312.
163. Id.
164. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

Apparently, there have been no cases where the defendant has argued
for the exclusion of evidence gathered by a police officer posing as a
reporter. Outler was the closest, but there the due process issue focused65
on the government's involvement in publicity adverse to the defendant.'
For a defendant to use the journalist's privilege to exclude evidence, the
defendant must invoke the privilege on his behalf. Thus, this question
must be answered: Whose privilege is it?
Except for the journalist's privilege, evidentiary privileges are for the
I Courts view the
benefit of the source, such as the client or patient. '6
journalist's privilege as a journalist's tool, for the journalist's benefit,
and allow only the journalist to invoke it. 167 Some commentators believe
although it is exercised
the journalist's privilege belongs "to the 'public
6
on the public's behalf by the journalist."'

The source, too, is a member of the public. When making a disclosure
to a reporter, the source relies on the privilege-the source's liberty is
at stake. Criminal defendant-sources tried to invoke the journalist's privilege in the cases of Lipps v. State'69 and Hestand v. State. 70 The
defendants in those cases (which arose out of the same incident) were
17
Both
convicted of inflicting physical injury while attempting robbery.
appealed, contending that newspaper reporter Richard Johnson should
not have been allowed to testify as to admissions the defendants made
to Johnson while in jail. 72 According to the defendants, the statements
were given in confidence.'7 3 The Indiana Supreme74 Court upheld the trial
court's overruling of the defendants' objections:1
[S]ince the very nature of the reporter's work requires him to divulge
the information he receives, albeit not the source, anyone wishing to
rely on the confidential status of information given to a newspaper
reporter must do so at his own peril. While Indiana does have a
statute protecting a newspaper reporter from being compelled to disclose the source of his information . . . the statute creates a right
personal to the reporter which only he may invoke .... [The privilege]

cannot be invoked by the person who communicated with7 the reporter
and now seeks to prevent the reporter from testifying.'1
Criminal defendants do not, however, divulge information to doctors
or lawyers at their own peril. By invoking the proper privilege, defendants
may prevent those professionals from testifying as to the defendants'

165. See id.
166. Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilegefor Journalists' Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection,
51 Mo. L. REv. 1, 49 (1986).
167. See id.
168. VAN GERPEN, supra note 142, at 69.
169. 258 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 1970).
170. 273 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1971).
171. Id. at 283; Lipps, 258 N.E.2d at 623.
172. Hestand, 273 N.E.2d at 283.
173. Lipps, 258 N.E.2d at 625.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 626.
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confidential statements.76 The Lipps and Hestand court did not address
that important point.
Judge Jackson's Lipps opinion did contain some potential Fifth
Amendment' opposition to the admission of evidence gathered by police
officers posing as reporters, at least if the source is in custody. 78 Judge
Jackson cited Miranda v. Arizona,79 the famous case that requires advice
of certain constitutional rights before custodial questioning: 80 "[Ifl a
third person [is] acting as an agent for the police ... a Miranda warning
would conceivably be required .... ."181 The same reasoning should apply
when the questioner is not an agent for the police, but a police officer
posing as a reporter.
State Exclusionary Rule
The best argument for the exclusion of evidence gathered by a police
officer posing as a reporter in New Mexico may be that admission would
be contrary to the reason for New Mexico's supreme court-created journalist's privilege. In McNabb v. United States, 82 the United States Supreme
Court stated that "[tihe principles governing the admissibility of evidence
in . . . criminal trials have not been restricted . . . to those derived solely
from the Constitution."'' 83 The McNabb rule applies only to federal
cases, 84 but state courts also have the power to adopt similar policies
by making and applying their exclusionary rules. 8 5
Simply put, if the New Mexico Supreme Court decides certain evidence
was gathered while acting in a manner contrary to its policy, the court
can declare such evidence inadmissible. 86 The supreme court created New
Mexico's journalist's privilege, so excluding evidence gathered by police
officers posing as journalists would make sense.
E.

V.

CONCLUSION
An Albuquerque police officer posed as a reporter to arrest a graffiti
vandal, sparking a controversy that involved several areas of the law.
Criminal, constitutional, evidentiary, as well as ethical and safety concerns
loomed in the opinions expressed by observers and those involved. The
Albuquerque Police Department's policy on the practice has since been
narrowed, but not abated.
The relationship between the police impersonation of reporters and the
journalist's privilege is at the heart of the controversy. The policy behind

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id.; Hestand, 273 N.E.2d 282.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Lipps, 258 N.E.2d at 626-27.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Lipps, 258 N.E.2d at 626.
Id. at 627.
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Id. at 341.
Id.
MCCORMICK, supra note 90, § 171.
See id.
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the privilege may be constitutional or simply utilitarian. The constitutional
argument appears to be the strongest: the journalist's privilege is crucial
to a free press, as guaranteed by the First Amendment.
A defendant who faces adverse evidence obtained by a police officer
posing as a reporter may argue that the evidence is inadmissible because
of a due process violation. Such an argument may be aided by persuading
the court that the defendant may invoke the journalist's privilege. Even
without the constitutional argument for exclusion, a defendant may convince the court that a state exclusionary rule is appropriate.
DANIEL M. FABER

